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Multitasking refers to the performance of a range of tasks that have to be 
completed within a limited time period. it differs from dual task paradigms 
in that tasks are performed not in parallel, but by interleaving, switching 
from one to the other. it differs also from task switching paradigms in that 
the time scale is very much longer, multiple different tasks are involved, and 
most tasks have a clear end point. Multitasking has been studied extensively 
with particular sets of experts such as in aviation and in the military, and 
impairments of multitasking performance have been studied in patients with 
frontal lobe lesions. Much less is known as to how multitasking is achieved 
in healthy adults who have not had specific training in the necessary skills. 
This paper will provide a brief review of research on everyday multitasking, 
and summarise the results of some recent experiments on simulated everyday 
tasks chosen to require advance and on-line planning,  retrospective memory, 
prospective memory, and visual, spatial and verbal short-term memory.
The adult human mind is remarkably adept at selecting and implementing 
a wide range of mental functions for multiple interactions with the world. 
These interactions may be planned or spontaneous, but are constrained by 
physical and mental capacities or by time and the physical environment, of-
ten requiring multiple tasks or multi-part tasks. Successful implementation 
requires the efficient ordering or interleaving of tasks, and occasionally per-
forming tasks in parallel. every-day examples are cooking a meal, a time-
limited shopping trip, or completing a range of different office based tasks. 
Despite its ubiquitous everyday requirement, there is limited insight into how 
everyday multitasking is achieved by healthy adults and how performance 
might be constrained or enhanced. Key to multitasking success is the ability 
to draw on a wide range of cognitive functions acting in concert to achieve 
multiple goals or multi-layered goals. These widely varying and frequent 
demands on the whole cognitive system are in contrast to the majority of 
research on human cognition that tends to focus on individual cognitive func-
tions in relative isolation, such as perception, attention, prospective memory, 
semantic and episodic memory or working memory. 
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everyday multitasking of this kind is very different from the laboratory 
based paradigms that examine the microstructure of rapid switching between 
laboratory tasks (e.g. Koch, gade, Schuch & Philipp, 2010; Logan, 2006; Mey-
er, evans & Rubenstein., 2001; Monsell, 2003). These paradigms typically fo-
cus on response time costs in tens of milliseconds when switching between two 
simple tasks that can be performed indefinitely, such as classifying numbers as 
odd or even, or classifying letters as consonant or vowel. These performance 
costs are apparent whether the experimenter determines when task switches 
should occur or if the participant themselves decides when to switch. in the 
latter case, participants have a tendency to perseverate on one of the tasks as 
well as showing a cost when they do switch to the alternate task (e.g.  Ar-
rington & Logan, 2004; Vandamme, Szmalec, Liefooghe  & Vandierendonck, 
in press; Vandierendonck, Liefooghe  & Verbruggen, 2010). everyday multi-
tasking involves much longer time scales where rapid and accurate response 
times are less crucial, multiple different and multi-part tasks are involved, and 
most tasks have a clear end point, with participants performing a series of tasks 
in a particular order and switching as each task is completed. For similar rea-
sons, everyday multitasking is also very different from paradigms that  explore 
the ability to carry out two laboratory tasks concurrently when they do not 
involve bottlenecks in stimulus input, cognitive processing or response output 
(e.g. Logie, Cocchini, Della Sala & Baddeley, 2004; Van der Meulen, Logie  & 
Della Sala, 2009; wickens, 2008), and when tasks are chosen to ensure that 
such bottlenecks are in place (e.g. Logan & gordon, 2001; Logan, Schneider & 
Bundesen, in press; Ruthruff, Pashler & Klaassen, 2001).
one general approach has been to consider expert multitasking in specific 
domains, for instance emergency medicine and medical decision making 
(e.g. Chisholm, Dornfeld, Nelson & Cordell 2001; Law et al., 2005; van der 
Meulen et al., 2010), military and aviation (e.g. Loukopoulos, Desmukes & 
Barshi, 2009), management (Seshadri & Shapira, 2001), navigation (e.g.  Spi-
ers & Maguire, 2006), or driving (e.g. Levy & Pashler, 2008; Strayer, Drews 
& Crouch, 2006). However, these studies do not consider non-expert every-
day multitasking of the kind addressed in this chapter. other studies have ex-
plored non-expert planning and implementation of subgoals within problem 
solving domains such as use of the Tower of London or Tower of Hanoi (e.g. 
Phillips, gilhooly, Logie, Della Sala & wynn, 2003; Shallice, 1982; ward & 
Allport, 1997). However, these laboratory based tasks are somewhat artificial 
and also do not address the broader demands of multitasking.
Although there is almost no literature on everyday multitasking in healthy 
adults, there are relevant studies on everyday multitasking deficits of patients 
with acquired brain injury (e.g., Crépeau, Belleville & Duchesne, 1996; Lev-
ine, Dawson, Boutet, Schwartz & Stuss, 2000; Miotto, & Morris, 1998; Shal-
lice & Burgess, 1991). The Multiple errands Test (MeT) originally developed 
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by Shallice and Burgess (1991), involved taking participants to a real shopping 
centre and asking them to complete a list of tasks of varying difficulty, for 
example buying a loaf of bread (easy) or finding the name of the coldest place 
in Britain the day before (more difficult). They had to spend as little money 
as possible and not go to any shop more than once. The multitasking demand 
arose from having to complete all the errands as quickly as possible, and so 
required the participant to decide which shops to visit and find an efficient 
route between them. Some of the results of that study (adapted from Burgess 
et al., 2006) are illustrated in Figure 1, which shows (to the left) a typical route 
taken by a control participant, and (to the right) the route taken by one of the 
brain damaged patients. The routes are dramatically different and show clearly 
the problems encountered by the patient in carrying out this everyday set of 
tasks. in that same study, Shallice and Burgess (1991) showed another test, the 
Six elements Test, to be equally sensitive to the brain damage. This involved 
swapping between tasks carried out in a laboratory/clinic such as describing 
aloud two recent journeys, writing down the names of pictures, and solving 
arithmetic problems, with an overall time limit of 15 minutes. it is particularly 
striking that the Multiple errands Test and the Six elements Test were both 
much more sensitive to the effects of frontal lobe damage than were standard 
neuropsychological measures of executive function. This suggests that multi-
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  Figure 1
the left figure shows a typical route taken by a healthy control participant in  
completing errands in a shopping centre in shallice and Burgess (1991).  
the right figure shows the route taken by a patient with frontal lobe damage. 
(reproduced from Burgess et al., 2006, with permission)
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tasking might not simply be considered an executive function in healthy adults. 
in both tests, the patients tended to spend too long on individual tasks. Shallice 
and Burgess concluded that the patients had a problem with keeping track of 
and/or implementing their intentions to swap to other tasks.
For the purposes of exploring multitasking in healthy adults, the Multiple 
errands test has a major advantage over the Six elements Test and standardised 
neuropsychological tests in that it is close to real life multitasking. However, 
healthy participants tend to perform at ceiling on the version originally used, 
although the test is sufficiently flexible that it could be made more challenging. 
More important, for testing both patients and healthy controls, there are obvious 
drawbacks in the administration of tasks conducted in real-life settings (Bailey, 
Henry, Rendell, Phillips & Kliegel, 2010; elkind, Rubin, Rosenthal, Skoff & 
Prather, 2001; Tranel, Hathaway-Nepple & Anderson, 2007). First, this type of 
task is both costly and time consuming as it requires consent from local busi-
nesses in the testing area, participants have to be transported to and from the test 
session, and research staff must be present at all times. Second, there is a lack 
of experimental control in that a crucial shop might spontaneously close at the 
time of testing, and members of the public or maintenance and repair works can 
compromise the safety of participants, as well as the reliability with which the 
same experimental procedures can be followed on different testing sessions or 
with different participants. For example, one of the patients in the Shallice and 
Burgess study started an argument with one of the shop assistants while trying 
to get a postcard without paying. Third, some participants may be more familiar 
than others with the particular shopping centre chosen, and the task set would 
have to be adjusted for use in shopping centres in other towns or cities if the 
procedure is to be of more general use. As a result, it cannot easily be adapted 
for other clinical or research settings. Finally, data collection is labour intensive 
in that it involves at least one experimenter (Shallice & Burgess used two experi-
menters) following the participant and noting manually where they go and what 
they do. Moreover, the fact that they are being observed so closely could affect 
how the participants undertake their tasks. For all of these reasons, the Multiple 
errands test has not been widely used in clinical or research settings, despite its 
real-life relevance and sensitivity to frontal lobe damage. 
A number of multitasking studies on brain damaged patients were carried 
out in the decade subsequent to the seminal paper by Shallice and Burgess 
(1991). Reviews of these studies are given in Burgess (1997; 2000; Burgess, 
Alderman, evans, emslie & wilson, 1998). Burgess, Veitch, de Lacy Costello 
and Shallice (2000) were the first to offer a statistical model of multitasking. 
This was based on a study of 60 individuals with frontal lobe damage and 60 
age-matched healthy controls. given the practical difficulties with the Multiple 
errands Test, they focused on a laboratory table-top set of three tasks, labelled 
collectively as The greenwich Test. This comprised making small models 
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from plastic meccano,  sorting beads by colour, and tracing tangled lines on 
paper. Participants switched between the tasks when they wished, and the goal 
was to maximise the score for all three tasks over a period of ten minutes. 
The requirements for the greenwich test incorporated voluntary switching 
between tasks and planning strategies to maximise overall test score. Scores 
were generated for test performance, for ability to learn and remember the task 
instructions, to make and follow a plan, and to later recount actions that had 
been taken. The patients performed more poorly than controls, but Burgess et 
al. (2000) noted that the data for both groups appeared to have the same basic 
factor structure. They constructed a structural equation model that identified 
contributions from retrospective memory for the task and task rules, intention-
ality or the ability to act on future intentions often referred to as prospective 
memory, and planning. This is illustrated in Figure 2. in their model planning 
and intentionality drew on the products of retrospective memory for successful 
performance. The model offered a good fit with the data for both groups, but a 
two-factor model (without planning) was also a good fit. Planning was included 
nevertheless to account for their additional neuroanatomical evidence. Specifi-
cally, Burgess et al. had Computerised Tomography scans of all of the brain 
damaged patients and observed that planning deficits were associated with le-
sions to the right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, but not with damage to other 
frontal areas such as the left posterior cingulate which affected all measures 
except planning. Damage to very anterior regions such as Brodmann's areas 8, 
9 and 10 also did not affect planning, but did affect task switching and breaking 
rules of the tasks. Subsequently, Burgess,  Simons, Coates and Channon (2005) 
suggested that planning is itself multifaceted and supported by a range of cog-
Figure 2
a simplified illustration of the Burgess et al. (2000) structural equation model of 
multitasking based on 60 brain damaged patients and 60 healthy controls  
performing the greenwich test. reproduced with permission 
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nitive abilities; a view shared by a range of other authors (see reviews in Morris 
and ward, 2005). Therefore it would be important to identify those individual 
cognitive abilities rather than use the umbrella concept of planning.
one candidate not considered by Burgess and colleagues is working 
memory capacity: the system thought to store and manipulate information 
relevant to immediate sub-tasks (Baddeley, 1986; Baddeley & Logie, 1999; 
Logie, 1995; 2003; Logie & van der Meulen, 2009). where the individual 
sub-tasks in multitasking occupy more of the capacity of working memory, 
it may be more difficult to remember to act on future intentions or develop 
an efficient strategy. in the greenwich test all three tasks were in full view 
and it was obvious how much of each task had been completed throughout 
test performance. As a result, there would have been very limited involve-
ment of working memory to keep track of test progress, although working 
memory might have been required for on-line planning of which task to do 
next and how long to stay with the current task in order to maximise over-
all score.  König, Bühner and Mürling (2005) found that working memory 
was a more important predictor of performance than fluid intelligence or 
attention on a simultaneous capacity/multitasking test named SiMKAP. 
However, this involved swapping between artificial laboratory tests such 
as matching number or letter sequences, and answering factual questions 
based on semantic memory or arithmetic knowledge, with inclusion of only 
one everyday simulation of checking appointments against commitments 
in a calendar. The task requirements for the working memory tests were 
not dramatically different in that, for example, the verbal working memory 
test involved factual questions based on semantic memory and memory for 
word sequences. it could then be argued that strong correlations might have 
been expected between the SiMKAP battery and the chosen measures of 
working memory when considering task requirements.
The greenwich Test used by Burgess et al. (2000) involved tasks that could 
be performed in any order chosen by the participant. in real life multitask-
ing the sub-tasks often have an optimum order; when cooking for example, 
it makes sense to begin with the dish that will take the longest to heat. Craik 
and Bialystock (2006) addressed this issue in a study of cognitive aging. 
They used computer simulated breakfast making in which participants had 
to set a simulated table by clicking on and moving cutlery and plates on the 
computer screen as many times as possible. in addition, they had to switch 
to alternate screens for starting and stopping the preparation of five differ-
ent foods each with different cooking times (sausages, eggs, toast, coffee, 
pancakes). A screen shot illustrating the table and each of the food screens is 
shown in Figure 3. There were prospective and retrospective memory com-
ponents but the focus was on prospective memory for starting and stopping 
the foods at the correct time. An age-related impairment in performance was 
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clear in their data when comparing 18-30 year olds with 60-80 year olds. 
They also found that older participants who happened to be bilingual showed 
less of an impairment than did monolingual participants who were of a simi-
lar age. They suggested that being bilingual might be beneficial in countering 
the effect of age on the cognitive requirements of the task.
Fergus Craik kindly provided our laboratory with a copy of the breakfast 
task which we have used to explore the measures of individual differences 
in cognition that best predict performance (Logie, Law, Trawley & Nissan, 
2009). First, we compared 50 healthy young (aged 18-25) with 50 middle 
aged (aged 45-60) participants, the latter being a largely neglected group in 
studies of cognitive ageing. The middle aged group had significantly poorer 
breakfast making performance, as measured by the delays in starting each 
of the five foods relative to their ideal starting time. in a further, as yet un-
published laboratory study in collaboration with Feinkohl, we ran a more 
realistic simulation of the breakfast task in which participants placed real 
cutlery and plates on a real table, while they started the ‘cooking’ of each of 
five foods set up as five separate video recordings of real foods being cooked. 
Again, the older group performed more poorly than the younger group, but 
the age effect was smaller with the realistic simulation on the measure of 
Figure 3
screenshot of the Craik and Bialystock (2006) breakfast task
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table setting, suggesting that the older people were disadvantaged by interact-
ing with the computer simulation. 
our very recent studies, described briefly above, on prospective memo-
ry in the multitasking setting of the breakfast making simulation are in the 
process of being prepared for publication. However, the results on ageing 
are consistent with a separate, very large scale published study carried out 
via the internet in collaboration with the British Broadcasting Corporation 
(Logie & Maylor, 2009; Maylor & Logie, 2010). This involved 318,614 par-
ticipants, aged 8-80 years who undertook a range of working memory tasks, 
within which were embedded a one-shot prospective memory and a one-shot 
retrospective memory test. This then comprised a multitasking scenario with 
participants swapping from one task to another, except that each task had to 
be completed before the next one was started and tasks had to be performed 
in the order determined by the experimenter while retaining the prospective 
intention and the retrospective episodic details. Both prospective and retro-
spective memory showed a decline across middle age, but there was a much 
steeper decline for prospective memory.
A range of individual difference measures were also collected in the Lo-
gie et al. (2009) study on the breakfast simulation, including verbal working 
memory span (Baddeley, Logie, Nimmo-Smith & Brereton, 1985) and choice 
reaction time, as well as backwards digit span and digit-symbol coding from 
the wechsler Adult intelligence Scale, the wechsler Test of Adult Reading, 
and Matrix Reasoning from the wechsler Abbreviated Scale of intelligence.
Among the 50 younger participants, only the Backwards Digit Span pre-
dicted breakfast task performance (r=0.313), whereas among the 50 middle 
aged participants, only Choice Response Time was a significant predictor 
(r=0.323).
in sum, middle age appears to result in performance reductions in tests 
of prospective memory embedded within multitasking paradigms. Striking, 
however, was the lack of a correlation in either group between the simulated 
breakfast making and a measure of working memory that has been shown to 
correlate with a wide range of demanding cognitive tasks, including meas-
ures of fluid intelligence. From these results, we might conclude that working 
memory makes no contribution to breakfast task performance, nor indeed 
did measures from standard tests of intelligence. However, it is important to 
note that measures of individual differences reflect, by definition, the maxi-
mum score that each individual can achieve on the tests that they perform. 
This does not allow for the possibility that several cognitive functions might 
nevertheless be crucial for performance, but without being required at the 
maximum for each individual. For example, assuming a basic competence 
with auditory comprehension, and adequate functioning of the auditory sen-
sory system, a measure of individual differences in hearing ability among a 
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group of people would most likely be a poor predictor of spoken language 
comprehension. However, this does not mean that a minimum level of hear-
ing ability is not required for the task. it simply means that the task requires 
much less than the maximum auditory sensitivity of which each person is 
capable in order for them to understand the spoken input stream. 
Following the above argument in the current context, working memory 
might well be involved in simulated breakfast making, but the latter task 
might not require all of the working memory capacity that is available within 
each individual tested. in an as yet unpublished collaboration with Fiore and 
Floyd, we asked younger healthy participants to perform the breakfast task 
on its own or to perform it at the same time as listening to a series of sen-
tences and remembering the final words of each sentence. This secondary 
task load was very similar to the task used to measure working memory 
ability in the previous experiment. A further group of young healthy partici-
pants was asked to repeat aloud random sequences of eight digits spoken to 
them by the experimenter while they were doing the breakfast task.  Results 
showed that breakfast task performance was very seriously impaired when 
it had to be performed with a concurrent working memory task or with oral 
recall of digit sequences. in other words, when working memory resources 
are required to perform some other task at the same time, the breakfast task 
suffers. Therefore, some minimum level of working memory capacity is es-
sential for breakfast task performance, but this does not require all of the 
working memory capacity available. So, an individual differences analysis 
based on assessment of maximum capacity limits is not sensitive to this con-
tribution to task performance.
 The breakfast task is useful is simulating an everyday activity, and has 
shown promise in initial attempts to explore the effects of cognitive ageing 
on aspects of everyday multitasking. However, it involves relatively simple 
planning with task order based on cooking times, while swapping between 
tasks that are very similar to one another. As such, there is heavy reliance 
on prospective memory and much less reliance on memory for task instruc-
tions or strategic planning of the task order. This makes it less well suited 
for assessment of broader forms of everyday multitasking, and the cognitive 
functions required to support multitasking in younger healthy adults remain 
to be explored. A number of researchers have advocated the potential benefits 
of using more complex simulated real-life tasks in a virtual environment that 
are easily manipulated and modified to suit the experimental situation. For 
example, Burgess et al., (2005)  reported a laboratory based ‘Shopping Plan 
Test’ in which brain damaged patients and controls are shown a map layout 
of buildings such as a post office, medical centre, newsagent, pond etc. and 
are asked to plan the most efficient route to achieve a series of goals such 
as send a birthday card or feed the ducks at the pond. This task requires 
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route planning but lacks the test of implementing the planned activities in 
the environment. one study to address this was reported by Morris, Kotitsa 
and Bramham (2005) who used a virtual bungalow or warehouse, navigated 
using a joystick. Patients with frontal lesions showed impairments in the im-
plementation of plans to move furniture or goods between rooms, but this has 
not been used in studies of healthy adults. 
Mcgeorge and colleagues (2001) created a virtual version of the Multiple 
errands Test that retained many advantages of the real environment while 
achieving experimental control. in this Virtual errands Test (VeT), the en-
vironment (a university building) was presented as virtual 3-D on a computer 
screen, and navigated using a mouse. The errands were tasks such as buy 
milk, collect a book or meet a colleague, and the errands were completed in 
the real university building as well as in the virtual building. The virtual en-
vironment was just as sensitive as the real environment to executive dysfunc-
tion in brain damaged patients, showing very similar performance when real-
life and virtual versions of the same task were compared with healthy adults 
as well as with brain damaged individuals. Thus, virtual environments may 
offer a more appropriate, safer, and better controlled setting for assessment 
of multitasking abilities (see also Morris & ward, 2005; Law, Logie & Pear-
son, 2006), although our initial studies with healthy older people, mentioned 
earlier, suggest that poorer performance might arise from unfamiliarity with 
the use of computers or with using a mouse to control movements through a 
virtual environment on screen. So, further development work will be needed 
to use these approaches in studying healthy ageing as well as for assessing 
patients. However, the focus of all of these studies has been on impairments 
of multitasking and planning, rather than how these requirements of every-
day life are achieved by healthy adults.
The Mcgeorge et al. (2001) VeT was subsequently modified to be chal-
lenging for healthy adults in a study by Law et al. (2006) who asked partici-
pants to perform the VeT with and without secondary tasks. Performance 
on a secondary task thought to place heavy demands on working memory 
(random generation) was poorer when performed along with multitasking in 
a virtual environment than when performed on its own, although the mul-
titasking itself was unaffected by the dual task demand, with overall score 
being the same in single and dual task conditions. However, there are limita-
tions to the VeT (originally developed in the late 1990s) in that the graphics 
were somewhat unrealistic and the mouse based interface required a con-
siderable amount of practice to ensure smooth movement around the build-
ing. Collection of performance measures involved taking a video recording 
of each test session with subsequent manual scoring by the experimenter. 
Moreover, the software platform used to programme the VeT is no longer 
supported by the commercial company concerned.
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More recently, we have developed a new version of the VeT to study eve-
ryday multitasking in a controlled, laboratory setting, the edinburgh Virtual 
errands Test (eVeT). This has used a widely available commercial games 
platform that permits non profit development of virtual environments, and 
that is well suited to creating an environment for multitasking with realistic 
graphics and a smooth interface as well as the capability to record participant 
performance automatically. The eVeT comprises a virtual four storey build-
ing with five rooms and a set of stairs on each side of an open stairwell. There 
is an elevator and there are lockable doors on each of the stairs. A screen shot 
of the ground floor area is shown in Figure 4. The software records all the 
actions taken by each participant and when they complete each errand. it also 
records the position of each participant in the virtual building ten times per 
second, illustrated in Figure 5.
Figure 4
screenshot of the ground floor of the EVEt virtual building
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in a recent set of studies (Logie, Trawley and Law, 2010), we have used the 
eVeT with a paradigm similar to the Shallice and Burgess (1991) Multiple 
errands Test, but in a virtual rather than a real environment. Participants 
were given a list of errands to complete in the virtual building such as ‘Pick 
up the brown package in room T4 and take it to room g6’ or ‘get the door 
security code from room g8 and use it to unlock the door on the stairwell’. 
Some errands involved timed operations such as ‘Turn on the cinema in room 
S7 at 5:30 minutes’. There were eight errands in total, some with two or more 
sub tasks, and the overall task was to complete all of the errands within eight 
minutes. The errands were given in a random order and participants had to 
generate as efficient a route and sequence of errands as possible. in addition, 
participants completed tests of verbal working memory capacity (sentence 
span based on Baddeley et al., 1985), of spatial working memory (Shah & Mi-
yake, 1996), free recall of word lists to assess retrospective episodic memory 
(Capitani, Della Sala, Logie & Spinnler, 1992), and a new version of the 
Travelling Salesman Problem which requires planning of the most efficient 
route to visit a specified set of locations in a large array. 
A total of 153 healthy young participants (18-35) completed the experi-
ment. Multiple regression analysis showed that eVeT performance was 
significantly and independently predicted by the Travelling Salesman task 
34 
 
 
  Figure 5sample recording of a participant’s movements around the EVEt virtual building,  
plotted as x,y,z co-ordinates
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(β=0.291), by word List recall (β=0.229), and by Spatial working Memory 
(β=0.209). Verbal working memory did not make a significant contribution 
to the variance. Follow up experiments with smaller groups of healthy par-
ticipants demonstrated that a demanding verbal working memory task (ran-
dom generation of months of the year) performed concurrently with eVeT 
resulted in a significant reduction in eVeT performance.
in summary, simulated everyday multitasking, as measured by this new 
form of paradigm, based on a virtual environment relies heavily on planning 
(Travelling Salesman Task), on retrospective memory and on spatial working 
memory. Verbal working memory is involved in task performance, but makes 
its contribution well within the capacity of the individuals taking part. 
An exploratory factor analysis was then carried out on the whole data set 
that  included additional measures of eVeT performance as well as overall 
score. This identified three factors, namely Memory, Planning and  intention-
ality or prospective remembering. we then constructed a Structural equation 
Model including these three factors as latent variables, and this showed a 
good fit with the data. This is illustrated in simplified form in Figure 6. The 
model includes the same factors as did the Burgess et al. (2000) model illus-
trated in Figure 2, and is consistent with that earlier model in suggesting that 
Memory drives both intentionality and Planning. However, the relationship 
among the factors is different in that Planning also drives intentionality and 
the relative weightings between the factors are rather different. 
Figure 6
a simplified illustration of a structural equation model of multitasking based on 
153 healthy young adults performing the Edinburgh Virtual Errands test
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This study gives us some insight into the nature of the cognitive functions 
that are important for simulated everyday multitasking based on those indi-
vidual difference measures that were included. However, taking these results 
together with the experimental dual-task studies, it remains likely that addi-
tional, independent cognitive functions are important for successful perform-
ance, but the contribution from those functions is well within their capacity 
limits. what also seems clear is that there are differential contributions from 
a range of different cognitive functions, and performance is not driven by one 
overall factor such as general attention. This general conclusion is consistent 
with the substantial literature on expert multitasking which has identified 
multiple domain-specific cognitive functions that act in concert to achieve 
task performance (e.g. wickens, 2008). it is also consistent with a view of 
cognition drawn from the working memory literature that points to multiple, 
domain-specific resources (Baddeley & Logie, 1999; Logie, 2003; Logie & 
van der Meulen, 2009) rather than a domain general attentional system (e.g. 
Cowan, 2005).
This chapter set out to explore the ubiquitous everyday requirements of 
multitasking; the ability to accomplish a range of tasks by swapping between 
them strategically or by planning the order in which they should be per-
formed most efficiently. it is clear that much of the previous literature on the 
topic has tended to focus on various forms of expert multitasking in which 
people learn domain-specific skills for managing the performance of domain 
specific tasks, or response time and accuracy costs of switching between 
simple laboratory tasks. Studies of non-expert, everyday multitasking have 
tended to focus on performance impairments in individuals with focal brain 
damage, given that failures of multitasking are more sensitive to the effects 
of the damage than are many standard neuropsychological tests of executive 
function. Here, i have argued that we can draw on the paradigms developed 
to study brain damaged individuals to study everyday, non expert multitask-
ing in healthy adults, and using virtual environments and virtual tasks to do 
so. Moreover, the technology required to develop this approach is readily 
available and inexpensive, making it widely accessible for future research. in 
some senses, this could be described as a ‘paradigm’ shift in studying healthy 
cognition in that the experimental setting is more complex and entails the 
use of multiple aspects of cognition acting together. This is in contrast to 
the traditional approach to experimental cognitive psychology that tends to 
focus rather more on the microstructure of very specific cognitive functions 
individually such as visual attention, auditory attention, rapid task switching, 
verbal short-term memory, visual short-term memory, prospective memory, 
episodic memory, language comprehension or production. Humans operate 
in the world effectively because they can bring to bear all of these aspects 
of cognition in a co-ordinated way to achieve everyday goals, and rarely do 
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we draw on a single function in isolation, even in experiments designed to 
explore how we do so.
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